Abstract-In this paper, we evaluate the performance of 802.11p-based vehicular communications in the presence of radio frequency (RF) jamming attacks. Specifically, we characterize the transmission success rate of a car-to-car link subject to constant, periodic, and reactive RF jamming. First, we conduct extensive measurements in an anechoic chamber, where we study the benefits of built-in techniques for interference mitigation. In addition, we identify that the periodic transmission of preamble-like jamming signals can hinder successful communication despite being up to five orders of magnitude weaker than the signal of interest. We further provide the rationale behind this remarkably high jamming effectiveness. Additionally, we quantify the impact of reaction delay and interference signal length on the effectiveness of the reactive jammer. Then, by means of outdoor measurements, we evaluate the suitability of using the indoor measurements as a model to characterize the performance of car-to-car communications in the presence of RF jamming. Finally, we conduct outdoor measurements emulating a vehicular platoon and study the threats that RF jamming poses to this vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) application. We observe that constant, periodic, but also reactive jamming can hinder communication over large propagation areas, which would threaten road safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
V EHICULAR ad hoc networks (VANETs) have recently attracted the interest of researchers and industry due to their potential to improve road safety [1] and traffic coordination [2] . The packets exchanged by these applications require timely and reliable delivery, which poses a real challenge to VANETs due to the impairments of the vehicular wireless channel. To partially address these issues, standardization efforts have meanwhile lead to the approval of the IEEE 802.11p amendment [3] . For this amendment, the 802.11a physical layer Ó. Puñal is with the UMIC Research Center, RWTH Aachen University, 52074 Aachen, Germany (e-mail: punal@umic.rwth-aachen.de).
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(PHY) was modified by reducing the channel bandwidth from 20 to 10 MHz to better cope with multipath fading. Further features enhancing the reliability were the choice of the dedicated 5.9-GHz frequency band and the design of a prioritized channel access for critical messages. In the research domain, various works [4] , [5] studied reliability enhancing measures, such as the use of short packets and robust modulation and coding schemes. Except for higher layer security threats, which have been studied for example in [6] and [7] , VANETs appear to be quite reliable from a standardization and research point of view with respect to safety-critical messaging. However, the impact of radio frequency (RF) jamming on VANETs has yet to be studied. With the proliferation of powerful software-defined radio platforms that are capable of interfering 802.11p networks [8] , RF jamming could compromise road safety. RF jamming has been extensively studied in the context of classical 802.11 networks without accounting for the particularities of car-to-car communications. In addition to the differences in PHY design of 802.11p compared with other 802.11 amendments, the propagation conditions of VANETs are fundamentally different due to the highly dispersive and rapidly changing vehicular environment. Hence, we expect differences in the impact of jamming; therefore, experiments in representative vehicular scenarios are necessary to characterize the vulnerability of VANETs and its geographic extension. This paper addresses this shortcoming, and in detail, we contribute the following. 1) We provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the performance of 802.11p devices under the impact of RF jamming in an anechoic chamber. We significantly extend our earlier work [8] by increasing the granularity of the measurements and by accounting for a larger variety of jamming signals. In particular, we consider constant, periodic, and reactive jammers. Among other findings, we show that periodic jamming signals can impair communication up to a signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of 56 dB. 2) We present a detailed description of the packet detection procedure of a reference 802.11p implementation in an Atheros chipset. We identify the elements that are most vulnerable to RF jamming, namely, preamble-triggered false signal detection and dynamic range overflow at the analog-to-digital converter. Our measurements and observations extend earlier works [9] . 3) We propose a methodology for using the performance characterization carried out indoor as a tool for modeling the behavior of 802.11p networks in the presence of RF jamming. We apply the model to predict the performance 0018-9545 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
of two communicating nodes in a vehicular environment and observe high agreement between predicted and measured performances in the field. 4) We evaluate the impact of different RF jamming signals on a vehicular platoon by means of measurements. We confirm our earlier observations in [8] that any of the considered RF jamming attacks can effectively disrupt transmissions within a platoon over a large area. Particularly alarming are the dimensions of the communication blackout area caused by constant and periodic jammers, which can span more than 400 m in an open field environment. 5) We provide the outdoor data used in our earlier paper [8] and both indoor and outdoor data used in this paper. The data are available for download in CRAWDAD [10] , [11] to foster the reuse and fast progress on the topic. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we briefly describe the main PHY and medium access control (MAC) layer characteristics of 802.11p. Furthermore, we introduce the selected 802.11p devices and review the main packet reception steps and vendor-specific interference mitigation techniques. In Section III, we describe the setup and methodology chosen for the measurements in the anechoic chamber and present the results obtained in the presence of constant, periodic, and reactive jammers. Section IV reproduces, in an open field environment, the measurements carried out in the anechoic chamber. We show that the indoor results can be used as a model to precisely predict the achievable performance of two vehicles in the presence of RF jamming. In Section V, we highlight the threats that RF jamming poses to a vehicle platoon and observe a complete communication disruption over large propagation areas, particularly in the presence of nonreactive jamming signals. Finally, in Section VI we provide an overview of related work before we conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we briefly summarize the IEEE 802.11p [3] standard, which is part of the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard [12] and defines PHY and MAC functionalities. We further provide a description of the devices used in our measurements. Background information and descriptions are provided for the latter presentation and discussion of our results.
A. IEEE 802.11p
IEEE 802.11p is an amendment for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. It is based on the 802.11a amendment with some modifications, as shown in Table I , which are intended to increase the robustness of the transmission in highly dispersive vehicular environments. Communication takes place in the 5.9-GHz band, which is also known as the Dedicated Short-Range Communication band. The latter is divided into one control channel (CCH) and a variable country-specific number of service channels (SCHs). For instance, six and four SCHs are defined in the U.S. [13] and in Europe [14] , respectively. Each channel is split into 64 orthog- onal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) subcarriers, of which 48 are used for transmitting data, whereas four are used for time/frequency synchronization and channel estimation (pilot subcarriers). The remaining 12 subcarriers are disabled to accommodate the frequency guard bands of the signal.
Beacon frames are broadcast over the CCH to advertise services offered on specific SCHs. In addition, the CCH is used for the transmission of safety messages. The access to CCH/SCH is done in a frequency-division multiple-access/time-division multiple-access fashion, as specified by the multichannel operations of IEEE 1609.4 [12] . The latter mandates an equally distributed access time between CCH and SCH. Specifically, out of every 100 ms, 50 ms is allocated for transmitting and receiving on the CCH, whereas the remaining 50 ms is used for communication on the SCH. Hence, the overall network performance strongly depends on a correctly functioning CCH.
Every 802.11p packet consists of a preamble and PHY Convergence Protocol (PLCP), MAC, and WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP) headers, as shown in Fig. 1 . This control information is followed by a variable amount of payload data. 802.11p supports different modulation and coding combinations. Out of these different combinations, the PLCP header is transmitted using the most robust one, whereas MAC and WSMP headers are transmitted with the same modulation and coding as used for the payload. In general, the use of a robust modulation and coding combination is recommended to increase reliability at the cost of lower transmission rates [4] . The preamble consists of ten short training symbols, a guard interval, and two long training symbols, and it has a total duration of 32 μs. The format of the preamble is shown in Fig. 2 . During the short training phase, a known bit sequence is transmitted with a periodicity of 1.6 μs over 12 subcarriers evenly distributed over the bandwidth. This information is exploited to detect the signal, calibrate the automatic gain control (AGC), perform coarse frequency offset estimation, and synchronize the clocks of the senders and receivers. The two long training symbols employ 52 subcarriers to transmit a different bit sequence that is used to estimate the channel state and perform a fine frequency offset estimation and a fine time synchronization. The preamble is followed by the PLCP header, which contains information about the modulation used to transmit the MAC header and payload (RATE field). It further tells the receiver how long the remaining transmission is going to last (LENGTH field). A parity bit is also available to detect errors in the previous PLCP header fields. If the parity bit indicates that the PLCP header is free of errors, the receiver continues decoding user data for the time indicated in the LENGTH field.
The medium access in 802.11p is organized according to the standard carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. If a node wants to transmit a packet, it must first sense the medium idle for a certain time interval. The medium is considered idle if the detected energy is below the carrier sense threshold. Although the value of this threshold is not standardized, it is typically set equal to the receiver sensitivity. Some commercial 802.11 devices do not consider the medium busy if they cannot detect a legitimate signal [9] , [15] , which is the case with the 802.11p devices that were used in our experiments. This reported behavior does not conform with the 802.11 standard as the latter indicates that the carrier sense threshold should be increased by 20 dB in the cases where the preamble portion has not been detected (see [16, Clause 18.3.10.6] ).
B. Measurement Equipment: IEEE 802.11p Device
We use NEC Linkbird 802.11p [17] devices as the sender and receiver in all our experiments. These devices are the result of several vehicular communication projects funded by the European Commission and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research [18] - [20] . The Linkbird devices are reference implementations of the WAVE standard and have been widely used in VANET experiments [21] , [22] . The network interface cards of the devices feature an Atheros chipset (AR 512) with Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) version 0.9.17.1.
1) Details of the Packet Reception Process:
Packet reception in current wireless local area network (WLAN) devices is a complex process that consists of various concatenated steps, namely AGC, signal detection, time and frequency synchronization, and signal demodulation. In the following, we provide a detailed description of these steps in a commodity (Atheros) device. This information is relevant for understanding the performance impairments caused by interference signals.
a) Automatic Gain Control: Any signal that reaches the receive antenna (either noise, interference, or user information) enters the reception chain, as shown in Fig. 3 . The radio signal is first amplified, then mixed down to intermediate frequency, and amplified again. The signal is then split into complex components, which are mixed down to baseband where they are low-pass filtered and amplified. Both quadrature and inphase components are digitized by the corresponding analogto-digital (A/D) converters. Then, a power detector estimates the power after A/D conversion. This computation is completed rapidly (within one short training symbol [23] ) and, if necessary, is used to perform coarse gain adaptations in the analog domain (see Fig. 4 ).
Although the dynamic range of the A/D converters is typically large (e.g., 70 dB [24] ), the power of incoming 802.11 signals may span over an even larger range. Hence, additional adjustment steps are needed to bring the signal strength within the preferred range of the A/D converter, which is limited by the so-called coarse-high and coarse-low thresholds [23] . This range is significantly smaller than the full A/D converter range to avoid two potential problems: First, the incoming power exceeds the upper A/D converter threshold, leading to the distortion of the signal, and second, the incoming power is not sufficiently above the lower A/D converter threshold, which reduces the reception quality due to high quantization noise. If the detected power exceeds the coarse-high threshold, the analog gain is significantly reduced to bring the signal back in range (e.g., by 17 dB [23] ). Similarly, if the signal power falls below the coarse-low threshold, additional amplification is triggered. In the particular case that the incoming power saturates the A/D converter often enough, a quick and aggressive analog gain reduction (e.g., 30 dB [23] ) is performed to bring the signal back in range. The value for the coarse-high threshold is said to be between −70 and −60 dBm in [25] and between −65 and −61 dBm in [24] . Although we cannot confirm these values, the measurements presented in Section III suggest that our 802.11p devices use a threshold within the latter range.
b) Packet detection:
Once the incoming signal is within the preferred input range at the A/D converter, the receiver tries to detect the presence of a signal of interest. First, it has to be determined if the incoming signal is in-band or if it has been transmitted on a different channel; hence, it is not intended for the receiver. This is done by comparing the digitized power at the output of the A/D converter with the power measured after low-pass and decimation filter [23] (see Fig. 4 ). If the signal is determined to be in-band, it can be detected by means of two independent methods, which are correspondingly triggered depending on the power of the signal.
Strong signal detection is triggered by the sudden increase in signal power that forces the reduction of analog gain as described earlier. Weak signal detection is triggered to identify low-power signals that are in the range of the background noise power. The receiver looks for sequences with a periodicity of one short training symbol and compares the normalized self-correlation of a received sequence against a threshold. If the threshold is exceeded and a sudden increase in in-band power has been detected, the presence of a signal of interest is assumed. The packet detection phase is completed after a number of fine gain adaptations so that the signal is placed at the preferred level of the A/D converter. Finally, the selected gain is kept fixed for the remainder of the incoming signal.
c) Synchronization and demodulation: Prior to extracting the payload, synchronization of time and frequency is performed using the short and long training sequences. Then, the receiver extracts information from the PLCP header about the modulation used for transmitting the payload and the total length of the remaining packet. The PLCP header further contains a parity bit used to detect errors in the header itself. If no errors are detected, the receiver demodulates payload bits for the specified time. As our jamming signal is an OFDM signal carrying modulated random bits (explained later here), the receiver extracts bits from the signal that do not carry meaningful information. Depending on the value of the bit decoded at the position that corresponds to the (expected) parity bit and on the value of the previously decoded bits, the receiver may declare the presence of nonvalid or a valid OFDM transmission. In the latter case, the receiver can be kept busy for an unknown time.
2) Interference-Related Adaptation Schemes for Packet Detection: Interference signals can block successful transmission and reception in WLANs. They refrain the transmitter from accessing the medium; hamper an accurate amplifier gain configuration, resulting in a reduction of signal quality or distortion of the signal; and impair signal detection. For instance, this latter issue is addressed by the Atheros proprietary ambient noise immunity (ANI) technique [26] . An interfering signal can trigger strong or weak signal detection as already described. In both cases, the receiver has means to determine the presence of interference (e.g., by detecting framing errors based on the parity bit of the PLCP header or by observing a low selfcorrelation value) and to stop the reception process. However, by locking onto the interference signal, the receiver may miss the arrival of a legitimate packet. The ANI mechanism increases the robustness to this problem as follows. If the rate of false packet detection exceeds a certain threshold, the immunity is increased by reducing the sensitivity of the receiver. If, after the adaptation, the rate of false packet detection falls below a different threshold, the sensitivity can be progressively increased [26] . On the contrary, if the highest immunity level does not prevent the rate of false packet detection from exceeding the latter threshold, the OFDM weak signal detection block is disabled. Then, if the rate of false packet detection falls below the threshold, weak signal detection is enabled again, but a higher in-band power is mandated for triggering signal detection. Note that switching off the weak signal detection scheme may cause the receiver to ignore (weak) legitimate transmissions, resulting in performance degradation [15] .
3) Noise Floor Measurement and Adaptation: Atheros chipsets use the measured noise floor of the circuits as reference value to perform accurate measurements of the absolute signal strength. The noise floor present at the A/D converters consists of the thermal noise at the antenna plus the noise of the RF front end (or noise figure) [23] . The latter component is very stable against temperature changes and is measured during the AGC calibration phase, where the receiver circuits are isolated from the antenna. The periodicity of this calibration can be indicated in software, and it typically corresponds to 30 s [25] . Then, during operation, the receiver measures the environmental noise. Specifically, noise measurements are performed over short time spans during idle time, i.e., while the device is neither transmitting nor receiving any signal. To obtain the absolute power value at the antenna, the analog gain is subtracted from the power observed after A/D conversion and normalized based on the calibrated noise power. Then, when a signal of interest arrives at the receiver, the power observed at the A/D output is corrected by subtracting the analog gain and the measured noise floor. The signal power is reported via the received signal strength indicator (RSSI), which, in Atheros chipsets, is an expression of the SINR. The RSSI is expressed in decibels (relative to the noise power) and obtained once per packet based on the power measurement performed after the AGC settling time.
C. Jamming Equipment and Profiles
There are different ways of implementing a jammer for 802.11 networks. If protocol-compliant jamming is studied, the typical approach is to use off-the-shelf network interface cards and tune protocol parameters accordingly, for example, by disabling CSMA/CA carrier sense or backoff deferrals [27] , [28] . Alternatively, one can also study the impact of jamming devices that do not comply with the 802.11 standard, which is the approach taken in this paper. We use Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) for implementing different jamming profiles [29] . The WARP boards are software-defined radios where the PHY processing is realized on a field-programmable gate array, whereas the higher layer processing is performed on an integrated PowerPC core. The WARP board provides an 802.11-like OFDM PHY with a 10-MHz bandwidth. The transceiver of the boards [30] supports transmission at frequencies up to 5.875 GHz, hence covering two 802.11p channels [3] (i.e., channels 172 and 174). The board is designed to provide a maximal output power of 18 dBm in the 2.4-GHz band. As the transmit power in the 5.9-GHz band is not specified, we measured it with a spectrum analyzer and found it to be 16.75 dBm. The OFDM signals transmitted in the default WARP implementation do not comply with the 802.11p standard as the PLCP header fields, among others, differ from the specifications. Furthermore, the transmitted WARP signals do not block medium access. It has been reported [9] , [15] that certain commercial 802.11 devices (including our Atheros cards) consider the medium as busy only if they detect a standard compliant transmission. As already discussed, this design does not comply with the 802.11 standard.
Based on the WARP boards, we implement three different jamming profiles, namely periodic, constant, and reactive.
1) Periodic Jammer: The periodic jamming signal is characterized by a 64 μs ON phase and a 10 μs OFF phase (see Fig. 5 ). The frame format of the periodic jammer consists of a basic zero-payload WARP frame, as shown in Fig. 6 . The PLCP and MAC headers are both transmitted with a QPSK modulation.
2) Constant Jammer: The constant jammer is intended to be continuously transmitting a signal. Realizing this with the WARP boards is, however, not entirely possible. The amount of time that the device can be transmitting is upper bounded. We determined this time with an oscilloscope to be 2.71 ms. Furthermore, there is an unavoidable 10-μs idle gap between two consecutive transmissions required by the hardware to set up a new transmission. Still, this results in a jammer with very long active periods such that, in the following, we consider it as a constant jammer. To transmit the signal, random payload is generated to make up for the aforementioned 2.71 ms of transmission time. The random payload and the headers are transmitted with a BPSK modulation. Fig. 5 shows the constant and periodic jamming profiles in the time domain compared with a regular 802.11p frame. Note that the time relations in the figures are not to scale.
3) Reactive Jammer: The reactive jammer is designed to start transmitting upon sensing energy above a certain threshold. The default OFDM design of the WARP platform features an energy detection block, which compares the instantaneous energy measured at the receive antenna with a threshold. We set the latter to −75 dBm as we empirically determined it to be a good tradeoff between jammer sensitivity and false transmission detection rate. 1 If the detected energy exceeds the threshold during a certain time span (T detect ), an ongoing 802.11p transmission is assumed by the jammer. We set T detect to 2 μs to avoid reacting to sporadic noise power peaks. Then, the WARP device has to switch from idle to transmit mode, which introduces a delay of 10 μs. Hence, the minimum reaction delay corresponds to 12 μs, and it can be increased in microsecond granularity. In comparison to previous reactive jammers [31] , our design features the shortest reaction time. By appropriately tuning the reaction delay, the duration of the jamming signal T signal , or by adding sleep time phases, several reactive jamming patterns can be obtained, most of which are shown in Fig. 7 . In this paper, we consider a reactive jammer that emits a single signal per (detected) 802.11p frame. The reactive jamming signal is basically characterized by the tuple (T reaction , T signal ). The different configurations result in different start and end points of the attacks, as shown in Fig. 8 .
III. INDOOR EVALUATION
Before bringing our equipment to the field, we performed a set of measurements in an indoor environment to characterize the 802.11p devices. For this purpose, we used a 30 m 2 big anechoic chamber at the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto (FEUP), which provides a multipath-free and interference-free environment. The anechoic chamber is shown in Fig. 9(a) . In the following, we first give a detailed overview of the experimental design for these indoor measurements and present our results later. 
A. Indoor Experimental Setup
We characterize the receiver response in terms of the average packet delivery rate (PDR) in the presence of various jamming profiles. Inside the chamber, we placed the antenna of the transmitting 802.11p device on a pole. The jammer antenna was placed on a second pole, whereas the antenna of the receiving device was located on a box at a similar height. The actual devices were placed outside the chamber and connected to the antennas via cables. Then, we started with the transmission of payload packets from the transmitter to the receiver. These packets had a size of 100 B and were transmitted with the QPSK modulation at a rate of 6 Mb/s. Overall, one such packet occupies the channel for 232 μs. These packets were generated at a rate of 100 packets/s. Hence, the wireless medium was idle most of the time with respect to 802.11p transmissions. All received packets were recorded by an application, and the resulting traces were used to compute PDR and the reported RSSI from the receiver. Every measurement point was computed as the average PDR across a series of 10 4 packets. (For more details on the setup of transmitter, receiver, and jammer, see Table II .) We focused on the topology shown in Fig. 9(b) , and we additionally varied the attenuation of the jamming signal through the addition of RF attenuators. The signal and interference power at the receiver, and the resulting SINR values, are shown in Table III. TABLE III  POWER 
B. Calibration
Our 802.11p devices report an RSSI value for each successfully decoded packet. This RSSI value is designed to indicate the strength of the received signal in comparison with the anticipated noise floor (see Section II-B3). To simplify the analysis of the RSSI, particularly when deducting the average received power strength from it, we initially performed a set of calibration measurements. We describe here the procedure used to obtain 1) the relationship between the transmit power set in software to the actual power of the transmitted signal and 2) the mapping between RSSI (in decibels) and the actual received power (in dBm) above the noise floor.
1) Calibration of the Transmit Power:
We carried out this calibration by connecting the transmitter to a spectrum analyzer through a coaxial cable with 2-dB attenuation. Because we were measuring a pulse-modulated OFDM signal, the energy of each subcarrier varies from symbol to symbol. It is known that measuring the power of an OFDM signal is a challenging task [32] . Fig. 11 shows a transmitted 802.11p frame in the time domain as captured by the spectrum analyzer. The figure shows the high variance of power levels within the OFDM transmission. We used the maxhold function of the spectrum analyzer to obtain the average power over the signal bandwidth across a sequence of 10 3 packets transmitted with QPSK modulation that were carrying random payload. This method is considered in [32] as one of the most accurate approaches for measuring the power of an OFDM signal. In Fig. 10(a) we show the resulting relationship obtained from the calibration measurement. Every point in the graph corresponds to a single value obtained using the previous method. We observe slight deviations from a linear relationship at the lowest and highest power values, whereas a linear behavior can be observed for the range from 9 to 16 dBm. When driven at full gain, the measured power corresponds to 17.58 dBm, which is the configuration used in all our experiments. Note that the maximum power reported in the data sheet of the device is 21 dBm. Based on the measured values for the transmit power, we then proceeded to determine the mapping between RSSI and SINR.
2) Calibration of the RSSI: We connected the transmitter and receiver via a coaxial cable (2-dB attenuation) and increased the attenuation between them stepwise by adding Fig. 12 . Characterizing the impact of reaction delay and interference signal length on the effectiveness of the jammer. The reaction delay is a very important factor, as we observe that few microseconds larger delays result in a significantly lower jamming effectiveness. In contrast, the length of the interference signal has a limited impact on the performance. Important for the jammer is to interfere the preamble and relevant control information, e.g., PLCP and MAC headers. Prolonging the interference signal to also overlap with the payload does not increase the jammer effectiveness.
passive attenuator elements. This allowed us to precisely estimate the received signal power. Simultaneously, we recorded the average RSSI for a sequence of 10 4 packets. Fig. 10 (b) shows the data samples obtained in the experiments and linear and cubic fitting models for that data. Due to the lower complexity and high accuracy of the linear model, we use it for mapping RSSI samples σ to received power values γ (in dBm): γ = 0.856 · σ − 86.35. By assuming the noise power equal to the receiver sensitivity (i.e., −86 dBm) and adding it to the estimated received power, we convert all RSSI values to SINR throughout the experiments. With respect to the receiver sensitivity, we never obtained RSSI values lower than −86 dBm after the above conversion on any received packet. Hence, we consider the receiver sensitivity to be −86 dBm. This is in accordance with discussions in the Madwifi mailing list [33] stating that the freeware version of the driver sets the card sensitivity to 10 dB higher than the commercial version. However, we suspect that the lack of RSSI reports below −86 dBm are in fact a limitation of the driver and not of the hardware itself.
In Section III-D we conduct measurements that suggest that the hardware provides sensitivity of −96 dBm, whereas the driver reports could be erroneous by 10 dB.
C. Measurement Results-Reactive Jammer
In the following, we present measurement results regarding the impact of reactive jamming on the performance of 802.11p communications. For that, we show (see Fig. 12 ) the PDR for different SINR values, which are achieved by adding/removing passive attenuators to/from the RF output of the jammer device, Every depicted point corresponds to the average PDR value across a sequence of 10 4 packets. In addition, we compute the 95% confidence intervals but do not show them in the figures as they are below 1%. Small fluctuations of PDR and RSSI within a measurement are shown in Fig. 13(a) , where every depicted point corresponds to the average performance over 50 packet transmissions. As highlighted in Table III , higher attenuation results in lower interference power P J−Rx and, thus, in a higher SINR and vice versa. On the other hand, the received signal strength of 802.11p data packets P Tx−Rx was kept constant for all measured points. We considered several reactive jamming strategies, which are characterized by different reaction delays and signal duration, as shown in Fig. 7 . Note that the reactive jammer is triggered by legitimate transmissions only if the sensed power is above −75 dBm, which happens when the applied attenuation is below 36 dB (see Table III ). In that case, the jammer is not active and the legitimate communication is only disturbed by noise, which results in an SINR of 57 dB. a) Impact of Reaction Delay: Fig. 12(a) shows the PDR performance under the impact of the reactive jammer. In particular, we consider reaction delays of 12, 16, and 40 μs, and the interference signal has a fixed length of 500 μs. Recall that this jamming configuration sends a new signal when energy is sensed, however, only once per detected 802.11p packet. For comparison, we also show the performance that is achieved when the jammer is disabled and observe that the communication is significantly impaired by all reactive jammer patterns. Specifically, 10-dB stronger signals are required to fully overcome the jammer. It can be further observed that a slight increase in reaction delay results in a significantly lower jammer effectiveness. For instance, the PDR improves by up to 2 dB when the jammer requires 16 μs to react instead of 12 μs. These additional 4 μs are particularly important as they correspond to the short training symbols (t 8 − t 10 ) used for the coarse correction of frequency and time offsets (see Fig. 8 ). Finally, a jammer that reacts with a delay of 40 μs misses the preamble, and the PLCP header and has lower effectiveness of up to 3.5 dB.
b) Impact of Interference Duration: In Fig. 12(b) , we study the impact of the interference duration. For this, we consider the reactive jammer with 12-μs delay and three different duration lengths, namely, 47, 64, and 500 μs. As expected, the longer the interference, the more damage is inflicted on the communication success. However, reducing the interference signal from 500 to 64 μs has a negligible impact on the jammer effectiveness. Since the jammer already interferes the control information, only marginal gain is obtained from further interfering the payload part. However, interference duration of 47 μs partially misses the MAC header and leads to slightly lower effectiveness. In the selected configuration and for all the considered patterns, the impact of the reactive jammer degrades the 802.11p performance by at least 10 dB. When the signal of interest is 17 dB stronger than the reactive interference, the impact of the latter can be neglected. We conducted further measurements that consistently confirmed a 100% PDR under higher SINR conditions.
D. Measurement Results-Constant and Periodic Jammers
In contrast to the reactive jammer, constant and periodic interference signals, most of the time, do not overlap with the signals of interest and can be detected by the receiver as signals that do not comply with the standard. As introduced in Section II-B2, commodity WLAN devices are usually equipped with proprietary techniques to fight interference and can take advantage of identifying the presence of RF jamming signals. These interference mitigation algorithms require, however, a certain amount of time to converge. Therefore, the resulting performance in the presence of a jammer largely depends on whether the algorithms are still iterating or have already converged, which is highlighted in Fig. 13(b) . We differentiate between these two states and show the average PDR performance obtained during the initial transient and during the steady state, respectively. We define the initial transient as the time required by the receiver to bring the measured PDR to a stable value, which we observed to be typically in the range of 10 to 30 s. Correspondingly, we define the steady state as the time span where no appreciable PDR fluctuations are measured.
Initial Transient: Fig. 14(a) shows the obtained PDR during the initial transient in the presence of the constant and periodic jammers. For comparison, we also show the performance obtained when the jammer is switched off and in the presence of the reactive jammer (40 μs, 500 μs) . The results show the average PDR obtained over 10 4 packet transmissions. Again, the 95% confidence intervals were below 1% for most of the considered points. 2 The small fluctuations of the PDR in the time domain are shown in Fig. 13(b) . In the low SINR range, both the constant and periodic jammers are more effective than the reactive jammer by 3 and 7 dB, respectively. For higher SINR values, the constant and periodic jammers reduce the PDR to 0% after the nodes have reached a performance peak at 17 and 21 dB, respectively. We later discuss the reasons for this initially striking observation that the PDR decreases as the signal strength increases. The SINR range over which successful communication is completely blocked spans 18 dB in both cases. In the following, we refer to this situation of consistently having a PDR of 0% under good signal conditions as blackout phase. Perfect communication (i.e., 100% PDR) is achieved at an SINR of 40 dB in the case of the constant jammer. The periodic jammer is significantly more effective, and it blocks perfect communication up to 56 dB SINR.
Steady State: Once the algorithms for interference mitigation have converged, the resulting PDR changes significantly, as shown in Fig. 14(b) , which confirms the benefits of Atheros proprietary algorithms against interference. For instance, in the presence of the constant jammer, the blackout phase completely disappears, and the overall jammer effectiveness is comparable to the one of the reactive jammer. These results indicate that the interference mitigation algorithms allow the receiver to synchronize to incoming signals of interest and avoid being triggered by constant jamming signals. In the presence of the periodic jammer, the PDR increases remarkably in the low and mid SINR ranges, but the blackout phase covers the same SINR range as previously observed. Satisfactory performance is achieved at an SNR of 45 dB and perfect communication only when the SINR reaches 56 dB. Again, the 95% confidence intervals were below 1% for most of the considered points. 3 Blackout Phase: In the following, we elaborate on the rationale behind the observed blackout phase, focusing mainly on the steady state. In Fig. 14(b) , at an SINR of 21 dB, the interference signal reaches the receiver with a power of −60 dBm (cf. Table III ). This value is above the coarse high threshold and forces the receiver to perform a quick gain drop, as discussed in Section II-B1. This gain correction allows subsequent signals of interest (with a power of −38.9 dBm) to arrive within the range of the A/D converter without causing an overflow of the dynamic range [9] . If the jammer is further attenuated (i.e., for SINR values larger than 21 dB), the interference signal then reaches the receiver with power that is below the coarse-high threshold; hence, no gain correction is performed. Then, if a signal of interest arrives while the receiver is busy trying to decode the interference signal, the gain cannot be set appropriately and timely, which results in an overflow at the input of the A/D converter. This causes the observed decrease in PDR for an increasing SINR, which is highlighted in Fig. 14(b) , specifically in the SINR range from 21 to 44 dB.
The effectiveness of an RF jammer, particularly in the presence of interference mitigation techniques, highly depends on its ability to keep the receiver busy. In this respect, there are major differences between the constant and periodic jammers considered in this paper. This is mainly due to the weak signal detection procedure described in Section II-B1. Specifically, the constant jammer can trigger weak signal detection once per interference signal due to the initial preamble. Afterward, weak signal detection is no longer triggered since the random content carried by the interference packet is unlikely to self-correlate. Hence, the receiver is idle and can suitably perform AGC and synchronize with subsequent signals of interest, resulting in a satisfactory performance [see Fig. 14(b) ]. In contrast, the periodic interference transmits preambles about 50% of the time, thereby triggering weak signal detection at the receiver. Subsequent signals of interest induce a sudden increase in received power, so that the receiver tries to identify a valid signal. However, this happens without a prior adaptation of the gain. Therefore, the high incoming power of the legitimate signal falls outside the preferred A/D dynamic range, and the receiver cannot extract the user information. This leads to the initially counterintuitive behavior of observing a decreasing PDR for an increasing SINR, as shown in Fig. 14(b) .
Finally, a PDR of 100% is reached at an SINR of 56 dB, i.e., when the interference power is close to −96 dBm. At this point, the incoming power of the jamming signal does not trigger weak signal detection, nor does it degrade the signal quality.
Based on these results, we suspect that the sensitivity of our 802.11p devices corresponds to −96 dBm, as mentioned in Section III-B2.
Final Observations: There are three major observations that can be concluded from the results so far.
• In [9] , it is observed that an interference signal 20-30 dB weaker than the signal of interest can effectively disturb 802.11 transmissions. In our measurements, we find that a periodic signal with a very high ON/OFF rate and a preamble structure, can seriously hamper an 802.11p transmission despite being up to 56 dB weaker than the legitimate signal. Extrapolated to an outdoor environment, this means that a jammer located significantly far away from two communicating vehicles (that are close to each other) can still be very effective. We confirm this hypothesis in Section V. • In the steady state, a periodic jammer can achieve a significantly better performance than a constant jammer, whereas the latter has similar effectiveness as the reactive jammer. However, during the initial transient, constant and periodic jammers block communication in a similar way. The performance of 802.11p devices in the presence of a jammer is particularly vulnerable to preamble-like structures that reach high levels of self-correlation and trigger (at least) weak signal detection events at the receiver.
• State-of-the-art 802.11 devices perform a set of adaptation techniques in the presence of nonreactive interference that have the potential of improving the communication performance. Reducing the convergence time of such techniques could increase their applicability for 802.11p vehicular networks by better adapting to highly dynamic vehicular environments.
IV. MODELING THE IMPACT OF RADIO FREQUENCY JAMMING IN A GENERIC VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORK SCENARIO
Earlier, we measured and analyzed the performance of 802.11p hardware in the presence of RF jamming in an anechoic chamber, void of multipath propagation effects and influence of any external RF interference. We obtained a relationship between the PDR and the SINR in the presence of various jammer types. The results are VANET specific in the sense that the hardware used is a reference implementation of the 802.11p amendment. Here, we propose a method that uses those results as a model to study the impact of RF jamming on VANET communications in a generic setting. The method takes as input the positions of transmitter, receiver, and jammer, propagation models for the considered environment, and the PDR versus SINR results. The different steps are described as follows.
1) Obtain the distance from transmitter and jammer to the receiver. 2) Calculate the received power from the transmitter signal P T,Rx and from the jammer signal P J,Rx as follows: where G X,Tx and G X,Rx are the transmitter and receiver antenna gains, the attenuation a X is obtained using propagation models suitable for the environment under consideration, and P X,Tx is the transmitted power. P X,Rx and P X,Tx are given in milliwatts. 3) Calculate the SINR as 10 log 10 (P T,Rx /(P J,Rx + N )) [dB] , where N is the noise floor. The variables are given in milliwatts. 4) Finally, obtain the corresponding PDR at the calculated SINR using the indoor results. In the following, we validate this method through outdoor measurements.
A. Outdoor Scenario Characterization
The scenario selected for the validation measurements is a rural area located in the periphery of Aachen in Germany (see Fig. 15 ). This scenario provides two perpendicular roads. A main road that has a length of 600 m and a 120-m-long side road. The line-of-sight along the main road (about 300 m) is shorter than the total length of the latter due to a slight descending slope of the road. Furthermore, the area between the main road and the side road exhibits a moderate elevation of the ground that can block line-of-sight along the diagonal path between both roads. The amount of traffic in the area is negligible, with only a few sporadic cars.
This open space scenario offers a low dispersive propagation environment as there are no obstacles or buildings between or surrounding the vehicles. Therefore, shadowing, scattering, and reflection of the signals are expected to have a negligible impact on the performance. Hence, we select the Friis path-loss model [34] to be an adequate abstraction of the propagation environment and use it to model the signal attenuation in (1) . The model assumes a logarithmic decay of the received power with increasing propagation distance. Due to the existing terrain asymmetries in the considered scenario, we characterize the path-loss attenuation individually, along the main road and side road, as well as along the diagonal connecting both roads. For estimating the path-loss attenuation along the main and side roads, the transmitter is kept static at the crossroad and the receiver moves along the corresponding road, respectively. Similarly, for estimating the attenuation along the diagonal path, the transmitter is static at the end of the side street (about 120 m away from the crossroad), whereas the receiver moves along the main road. To obtain samples of the received signal strength, we let the transmitter and receiver communicate with the jammer switched off. In every measurement, the transmitter sends packets to the receiver at a rate of 100 packets/s for roughly 2 min. Transmission power, modulation, and packet format are the same as for the indoor measurements (cf. Table II) . We compute the distances between the devices from their reported GPS positions and use the signal strength values reported by the receiver and mapped according to the calibration results of Section III-B. Then, we obtain estimates of the model parameters by least squares fitting the measured distance and signal strength values to P r (d) = k − α · 10 log 10 (d) in dBm. Table IV shows the resulting path-loss parameterization and the respective RMSE obtained for each communication path. The parameterization for the diagonal path is out of the expectable range for such an environment, most likely due to the aforementioned terrain elevation. Nevertheless, Fig. 16 shows that the model fits well the measured received power values. In the following, we use the propagation models shown in Table IV to determine the expected received power of the transmitter and the jammer at the receiver.
B. Measurement Results
We conduct measurements in the previous scenario to validate the proposed method for modeling the impact of RF jamming on VANET communications. First, we describe the node topology and provide some details about the measurement methodology. Afterward, we present the results.
Setup and Methodology: We place the jammer at the end of the side street and the transmitter at the crossroad. The receiver is placed at different positions along the main road, as shown in Fig. 15 . The different node configurations result in varying SINR values. For every receiver position, the transmitter sends packets to the receiver at a rate of 100 packets per second over 2 min. This procedure is repeated for a representative subset of the available jamming patterns, namely, constant, periodic, and two reactive jammers with a signal length of 500 μs and reaction delays of 12 and 40 μs, respectively. While processing the data, we differentiate between initial transient and steady states for the constant and periodic jammers. Notice that the results presented here refer exclusively to the performance obtained during the steady state. Each graph shows the measured PDR and the predicted PDR using the proposed model. For comparison, we also show the PDR performance obtained when the jammer is switched off.
Reactive Jammer: Figs. 17(a) and (b) show the PDR obtained in the presence of the reactive jammers. The figure shows the average PDR and the 95% confidence intervals. As opposed to the results obtained in the anechoic chamber, the PDR measured outdoors exhibited moderate fluctuations for a given SINR point due to the higher signal strength variability expected in an uncontrolled propagation environment. In both cases, the performance predicted by the model follows closely the PDR measured outdoors. The shape of both curves is similar, despite an SINR offset of 1-2 dB.
Constant and Periodic Jammers: Fig. 18(a) shows the performance obtained in the presence of the constant jammer. The measured PDR follows the shape of the predicted graph, despite what seems to be an outlier at SINR of 11 dB and a slight overestimation of the PDR for higher SINR values. Fig. 18(b) confirms the presence of the blackout phase caused by the periodic jammer since we consistently measured a PDR of 0% for SINR values below 57 dB.
C. Final Observations
In general, the presented results show that the performance of outdoor communication under jamming can be well approximated by applying the method proposed at the beginning of this section. This procedure empowers the community to use the models to characterize VANET communications in the presence of a jammer and to perform jamming-aware design of VANET applications and protocols.
While the validation and accuracy of our method has been exclusively evaluated in open space environments, we do not anticipate fundamental issues that limit its applicability in urban environments. We underline that the accuracy of the prediction is mostly dependent on the characterization of the propagation environment, i.e., on an appropriate choice and calibration of the propagation model. However, in urban environments, this is a challenging task, as shadowing and multipath fading lead to signal strength fluctuations around the average value predicted by the path-loss model. The stochastic nature of these processes can be hardly predicted and affects both legitimate and interference signals. Consequently, the instantaneous SINR fluctuates and so does the quality of the communication. Under highly variable conditions, our model can nevertheless be used to provide bounds of expectable performance given an educated guess regarding the magnitude of the signal strength fluctuations. We have implemented and validated the model in ns3 [35] using the data from our previous work [8] . The simulation model for ns3 can be downloaded from [36] for experimentation and further development.
V. OUTDOOR PLATOONING EVALUATION
Here, we evaluate the quality of the communication between two vehicles moving as a platoon in the presence of an RF jammer. The platooning movement is characterized by a short and constant intervehicle distance and the same acceleration and speed across vehicles [37] . Platoons are intended to increase traffic efficiency, but they are vulnerable to jamming attacks. If the platoon is coordinated by a VANET connection, even short disruptions of the communication can have fatal consequences. For this study, we choose the same open space environment as in Section IV and an additional scenario, namely, the large parking lot near the seafront in Porto used in our previous work [8] . For convenience, we call these scenarios rural and seafront. In the following, we provide a description of the environment and the setup for each scenario and present the corresponding results.
A. Rural Environment
We place the jammer at the crossroads between the main and the side roads. The exact position is highlighted with a fire symbol in Fig. 19 . The communicating vehicles move at a constant speed of about 25 km/h along the main road, where they first approach the crossroad and later leave the jammed area. Note that, depending on the jamming signal, the vehicles start off at different positions. Specifically, in the presence of the constant and periodic jammers, the starting point is located far enough from the jammer to initially enable successful communication, whereas the required distance is shorter in the presence of the reactive jammer. Starting and ending points are highlighted in Fig. 19 as well. In our measurements, the transmitter is closely followed by the receiver, keeping an intervehicle distance of about 5 m. In this scenario, we evaluate the impact of constant, periodic, and two reactive jammers. Note that the relatively low moving speed is not expected to have a fundamental impact on the results as mobility alone does not alter the characteristics of the propagation environment. However, higher speeds would affect the results as both SINR and PDR would fluctuate over shorter time scales; therefore, the transition phases in the performance would be steeper. Although from a geographical perspective, the results are not expected to exhibit any substantial difference. Fig. 19 shows the threat that an RF jammer (constant and reactive in this case) poses to a vehicular platoon. The areas over which communication is successful are highlighted in green. 4 Whenever the communication is completely disrupted (PDR equals 0%) there is no color being displayed. Fig. 19(a) shows that the constant jammer effectively blocks the communication along the main road. Specifically, over a length of 465 m, no single packet is successfully received. Normal operation is only possible when the vehicles are significantly far away from the jammer. Similarly, Fig. 19(b) shows that the impact of the reactive jammer is significantly lower since the blackout area spans only over a road segment of 70 m with the jammer at its center. The indoor measurements of Section III indicate that, once the adaptive mechanisms of the 802.11p devices have converged, both constant and reactive jammers have a comparable impact on the communication. Outdoors, however, we observe major differences in the effectiveness of these two jamming signals. Therefore, the constant jammer effectiveness obtained during the initial transient [see Fig. 14(a) ] should be rather considered for predicting the achievable performance in the platoon configuration. This can be explained by the changes in topology and propagation conditions as the vehicles move since, in this situation of continuous change, the 802.11p devices have problems setting their working point within the steady state.
1) Results:
In the following, we show the time evolution of the PDR in the presence of the considered jamming signals. In addition, we superpose the behavior of the predicted SINR, i.e., the SINR computed based on the position of the vehicles and the jammer and the path-loss model. Specifically, we consider the path-loss model for the main road, as defined in Section IV-A.
In Fig. 20 , it can be observed that the temporal behavior of PDR and SINR is similar for both reactive jammers. Only when the platoon is close to the jammer that a complete disruption of the communication occurs. The transition between a PDR of 100% and 0% (and vice versa) lasts for 5 s, which at the speed of travel corresponds to 35 m. The blackout area is in both cases of similar length, namely 10 s or 70 m. During the transition time, a jamming detection strategy could extract and exploit important information from correctly received packets (RSSI, relative position of the nodes, and PDR, among others) that could reveal the presence of a jammer as proposed, e.g., in [27] . This information may no longer be available when the PDR drops to 0%, and jamming detection strategies may perform significantly worse or simply fail. The model used to map SINR to PDR shows very good agreement with the actual measured performance. Despite the mobility of the nodes, the proposed approach can be applied to accurately model the impact of reactive jamming on specific VANET platooning and VANET communications in general. Fig. 21 shows that the blackout area is significantly larger around the crossroad in the presence of constant and periodic jammers compared with the reactive ones. Basically, both jammers exhibit similar effectiveness by completely disrupting the communication over more than 450 m, as shown in Fig. 19(a) . 5 In both cases, the transition time spans 15 s. The model introduced in Section IV to predict the resulting PDR is again used in Fig. 21 . In the presence of proactive jammers, modeling the PDR in a scenario with mobility is considerably more complex than in the case of reactive jammers, which is reflected by a noticeable mismatch between predicted and measured PDR. In Section III, we have shown that the 802.11p devices require a certain time (initial transient) before the adaptation mechanisms settle at a robust working point (steady state). In the indoor measurements, we measured convergence times up to 30 s. However, in outdoor scenarios with mobility, it can be expected that the initial transient spans even larger periods. In the following, we show results for the predicted PDR based on both initial transient-state and steady-state values presented in Section III. In Fig. 21(a) , it can be observed that the initial phase provides a good match for the PDR performance obtained while the cars approach the jammer. When the cars leave the crossroads, i.e., move away from the jammed area, the PDR prediction is improved by using the steady-state values. Unfortunately, we are not able to determine the instant that separates the initial phase from the steady state. We believe that the mismatches between measured and predicted PDRs are rather a consequence of the complex algorithms featured by the Atheros cards than a fundamental problem with our modeling methodology. Fig. 21(b) presents similar results obtained in the presence of the periodic jammer. Again, the performance during the initial phase shows an acceptable match for the measured PDR when the vehicles approach the jammer. When they move away, the steady state is a better option.
B. Seafront Environment
This scenario consists of a 500-m-long parking lot near the seafront in Leça da Palmeira on the outskirts of Porto [see Fig. 22(a) ]. Due to the uniformity of the characteristics of the terrain and open space environment between the devices, we obtain a single propagation model for this scenario with an RMSE of 3.932 [35] . The jammer, marked with a fire symbol on the figure, is located 180 m from the north end of the parking lot and slightly over 300 m from the south end. During the measurements, few vehicles sporadically drove by at speeds up to 60 km/h along a parallel street located 30 m away from the measurement area. In this scenario, we consider a periodic jammer and a reactive jammer. 6 
1) Results:
A geographic visualization of the communication performance is shown in Fig. 22(a) , whereas Fig. 22(b) shows the time evolution of PDR and SINR in the presence of the periodic jammer. It can be observed that the SINR decreases very fast within the first 15 s due to the increasing interference caused by the jammer. Shortly after leaving the north end until 80 m behind the jammer (toward the south end), the communication is completely blocked. The jammer creates a blackout area of about 250 m, which corresponds to 45 s at the speed of travel (about 20 km/h). While turning at the end of the parking lot, both vehicles can communicate again for nearly 20 s (range from 60 to 80 s). From there, they return to the north end, experiencing again a large communication blackout around the jammer.
We conduct the same measurements with the reactive jammer. SINR and PDR are shown in Fig. 23(b) , and a geographic visualization is given in Fig. 23(a) . Recall that, for the reactive jammer to be active, it must first detect the transmitter. Then, to be able to impair packet delivery, it must also create sufficient interference power at the receiver. The communication is disrupted over 170 m in both directions around the reactive jammer, corresponding to 30 s, which is clearly visible in Fig. 23(a) . The interference range of the reactive jammer is shorter than for the constant jammer, namely, 170 m compared with 250 m. Although the reactive jammer is less effective, it still causes a significant damage to the communication in this scenario.
VI. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, the only previous works focusing on RF jamming attacks on VANETs are [8] , [38] , and [39] . In [38] , an approach for detecting reactive jamming in 802.11p networks is presented, but it does not assess the impact of RF jamming nor does it use realistic VANET scenarios for evaluation. In [39] , the impact of RF jamming on the dissemination of geocast messages is studied by means of network simulations. The attacker model consists of an 802.11p device tuned as a reactive jammer that sends a short signal upon sensing energy on the medium. It is shown that reacting upon sensing energy above the card sensitivity is significantly more effective (up to 20%) than reacting only if the sensed SNR is sufficient to decode the incoming packet. Both attacks are able to block the dissemination of geocast messages in a simulated two-lane highway. In a city scenario, however, the situation changes as there are alternative paths to disseminate the messages around the jammer. While these results are consistent with our observations in the field measurements and with our previous work [8] , we cover a wider range of jamming signal profiles. Furthermore, we have shown in Section III that the behavior of real devices in the presence of RF jamming is subject to complex performance issues. We believe that our measurements and proposed model can help researchers conduct realistic simulations of VANETs accounting for the impact of RF jamming.
Additionally, there is some related work on jamming at both MAC [40] , [41] and PHY [42] for classical 802.11 WLANs. In [9] , the vulnerability of 802.11b/g hardware to RF interference is studied, which are associated to timing recovery and dynamic range selection issues. In the study, a jammer that emits directsequence spread spectrum or OFDM-modulated signals that do not comply with the standard is considered and the study shows that weak interference (30 dB less power than the legitimate signal) can significantly disrupt the communication by impeding time recovery. Our measurements show that, depending on the relative position of the nodes, a periodic jamming signal completely blocks communication up to an SINR of 56 dB. Particularly damaging is the case of weak signal detection triggered by the jammer followed by an overflow of the A/D dynamic range caused by the signal of interest. The observation and characterization of this event further extends the work in [9] . We also confirm the importance of correct timing recovery and show a degradation in (reactive) jammer effectiveness that correlates with the proportion of preamble that is missed. In [43] , results are presented for the error performance of 802.11b/g networks under the influence of RF jamming. Their results show that wideband jamming damages OFDMbased 802.11g communications more severely (up to 7 dB) than they affect 802.11b (spread spectrum). In [42] , it is shown that a constant wideband noise signal is more effective (3-4 dB) than a constant wideband digitally modulated signal at disrupting 802.11g communications.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have described the receiver structure of a reference 802.11p implementation and characterized how different RF jamming profiles impact the communication. Then, we have proposed and validated, by means of measurements, a procedure that uses the relationship between PDR and SINR measured in a controlled environment as a model to study the impact of RF jamming on VANET networks and applications. Finally, we have applied the proposed method to predict the behavior of a vehicular platoon under the influence of jamming and have shown that the model provides realistic results. Furthermore, our results reveal that RF jamming poses a serious threat to VANET safety in general and platooning applications in particular. In the latter case, reactive, constant, and periodic jammers can severely disrupt communication up to 465 m, despite very short communication distances between legitimate devices. The significant impact of RF jamming reported in this paper highlights the need for jamming-aware communications, protocols, and applications, as well as effective jamming detection strategies. As a first step into that direction, we made our measurement data available for download in [10] and [11] to be used by the community as input to network simulations and for further analysis.
As major lines of future work, we foresee the design of algorithms and protocols that detect and/or mitigate RF jamming attacks, as well as warning systems that alert the drivers about eventually malfunctioning safety applications. Additionally, more resilient PHY designs (e.g., with more frequent channel estimation) may increase the robustness of VANETs to jamming. Finally, protection measures should also be considered in system design by, for instance, implementing critical functionality directly into the firmware.
